Main Research Interests

Philosophy of Biology & Scientific Classification
I have been thinking about philosophical questions about (primarily biological) classification for a while now. My first book, on the species problem (see right), was an unexpected spinoff of the research I pursued in 2010–11 thanks to a Scholar's Award from the National Science Foundation. During that time, I developed a general account of natural kinds — the Stable Property Cluster (SPC) account — suitable to accommodate biological categories. The details can be found in my "Natural Kindness" (2015, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science); I apply this account to cell-types in my "Cell Types as Natural Kinds" (Biological Theory) and to ecosystems in my "Anchoring in Ecosystemic Kinds" (Synthese). Before this, I explored the issue of natural kinds monism vs. pluralism in connection with enantiomers in my "Monism on the One Hand, Pluralism on the Other" (get it!?) and biological macromolecules in "Macromolecular Pluralism". I consider a variety of other cases, such as organ systems, tissues, races, and disease as future case studies for my account of natural kinds in a new book, The Nature of Biological Kinds — a sort of sequel to Are Species Real? — to be published by Oxford University Press (in 2024, hopefully . . . after many self-administered delays).

I've also been thinking a lot about the role that norms play in classification, a subject that comes up in my "Pluto and the Platypus". Matt Barker (Concordia) and I are working on a book on this subject (tentatively titled Norms of Scientific Classification).

General Philosophy of Science & Social Epistemology
Recently, I've become quite interested in epistemology — particularly issues in social epistemology (such as deference and testimony), dogmatic skepticism, conspiracy theories, disagreement, and understanding as they pertain to the general problem of scientific literacy and the division of cognitive labor. A major project on this — "The Production of Public Understanding of Science" (or "PoPUS") — kicked off in 2014 thanks to a grant from the Varieties of Understanding Project and is currently underway. I received a second NSF Scholar's Award for the 2018–19 academic year to pursue a book project on scientific literacy and science communication/education.

In the Philosophy of Science more generally, I have some joint projects now in their initial stages concerning special science autonomy, natural laws, and ontological commitment. I’ve also been thinking about science education and strategies for effective teaching in philosophy of science (following up on my “How to Justify Teaching False Science” in a special issue of Science Education).

Book:
Are Species Real? An Essay on the Metaphysics of Species

Are Species Real
What are species? Are they objective features of the world? If so, what sort of features are they? Do everyday intuitions that species are real stand up to philosophical and scientific scrutiny? Two rival accounts of species' reality have dominated the discussion: that species are natural kinds defined by essential properties and that species are individuals. Unfortunately, neither account fully accommodates biological practice. In the book, I offer a novel approach to this question aimed at accommodating the attractions to both realism and antirealism about species.  
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