Norms of Scientific Classification
Book manuscript in progress, jointly authored with Matthew J. Barker, Concordia University
Book manuscript in progress, jointly authored with Matthew J. Barker, Concordia University
This book offers a new view of scientific classifications, one with wide-ranging practical and theoretical implications. To start, we focus on how scientists actually practice and attempt to support their classificatory work and claims. How are scientific classifications made and revised? Are these episodes matters of discovery — more or less compelled by the world? Many scientists and philosophers seem to believe that the answer is yes. We call this traditional view the Discovery Picture. We argue that, while plausible, the Discovery Picture cannot be right. In many cases — maybe the vast majority — empirical data and arguments, while of course important to classification claims, fall short of justifying those claims than is typically realized. This raises serious questions about the objectivity of scientific claims. But it also advises us to move beyond disputes about objectivity, to focus instead on how classification claims are influenced by what we call pragmatic classificatory norms. Recognizing their influence puts us in position to locate the key good-making property of scientific classifications not in their objectivity, but in their rationality. Such rationality, after all, centrally incorporates the human goals, abilities, and values that pragmatic classificatory norms often encode.
1.1. Scientific classification disputes and the need to study them
1.2. The main questions and answers in the book
1.3. Outline of the book
2.1. A Picture of Scientific Processes
2.2. Functions of Scientific Classification
2.3. From the Wide-Ranging Influences of Scientific Classification, to the Wide-ranging Importance of its Philosophy
2.4. Looking Ahead
3.1. A First Glimpse of the Discovery Picture
3.2. Clarifying the Subject Matter
3.3. A More Precise Characterization of the Discovery Picture
4.1. Splitting and Lumping
4.2. Intension and Extension
4.3. Change of Location
4.4. Debunking
4.5. Invoking
5.1. Critiques of Essentialism
5.2. Discovering Pluto’s Non-Planethood?
5.3. An Odd Ball
5.4. An Odd Duck
5.5. Classificatory Shortfall Problems
6.1. A Minimalist Classificatory Wild West?
6.2. Direct Evidence for the Influence of Classificatory Norms
6.3. Indirect Evidence for the Influence of Classificatory Norms
6.4. Cases from Diverse Areas of Science more Generally
6.5. Why Think Classificatory Norms are Pragmatic, not Epistemic?
7.2. The chemical element category among others
7.3. Lumpers vs. splitters
7.4. Protons vs. electrons
7.5. Oxygen and the other individual element categories
7.6. Back to chemistry and subatomic physics
8.1. A Main Descriptive Argument to this Point
8.2. The Shortfall Premise: Meaning and Support
8.3. The Norm-Bridging Premise: Meaning and Support
8.4. Further Support of and Extrapolation from the Shortfall and Norm-bridging Premises
8.5. The Premise Taking us from Shortfall and Norm-bridging to our Descriptive Conclusion
8.6. Smoothing Out Wrinkles
8.7. The Necessity of Norms as Justifiers
9.1. From Objectivity to Rationality
9.2. The Threat to Realism
9.3. The “Anything Goes” Worry
9.4. The Role of Pragmatic Classificatory Norms in Justifying and Criticizing Classification Claims
9.5. Applications of These Strategies: Four Cases Examined
10.1. Discovery
10.2. Realism & Pluralism
10.3. Pluralism
10.4. Values
10.5. Methods
10.6. Progress
10.7. Recommendations
Slater (2017) "Pluto and the Platypus: An Odd Ball and an Odd Duck — On Classificatory Norms"
Barker & Velasco (2013) "Deep Conventionalism about Evolutionary Groups"
Barker (2010) "From Cognition's Location to the Epistemology of its Nature"
Coming soonish.... (~Fall 2024?)
(feel free to email us if you want to be notified when it's posted)