Books

Published

Forthcoming & In Progress

Are Species Real? 

What are species? Are they objective features of the world? If so, what sort of features are they? Do everyday intuitions that species are real stand up to philosophical and scientific scrutiny? Two rival accounts of species' reality have dominated the discussion: that species are natural kinds defined by essential properties and that species are individuals. Unfortunately, neither account fully accommodates biological practice. In the book, I offer a novel approach to this question aimed at accommodating the attractions to both realism and antirealism about species. 

Palgrave–Macmillan, 2013
New Directions in Philosophy of Science Series

Forthcoming with Oxford University Press

This book in progress brings together several of my previously-published papers on natural kinds together under the Stable Property Cluster (SPC) framework I published in "Natural Kindness" (BJPS 2015) and explores the interplay between realism (or something like it) and the vagaries of classificatory practice in a range of biological sub-disciplines.

co-authored with Matthew Barker (Concordia) — in progress

This book offers a new view of scientific classifications, one with wide-ranging practical and theoretical implications. To start, we focus on how scientists actually practice and attempt to support their classificatory work and claims. How are scientific classifications made and revised? Are these episodes matters of discovery — more or less compelled by the world? Many scientists and philosophers seem to believe that the answer is yes. We call this traditional view the Discovery Picture. We argue that, while plausible, the Discovery Picture cannot be right. In many cases — maybe the vast majority — empirical data and arguments, while of course important to classification claims, fall short of justifying those claims than is typically realized. This raises serious questions about the objectivity of scientific claims. But it also advises us to move beyond disputes about objectivity, to focus instead on how classification claims are influenced by what we call pragmatic classificatory norms. Recognizing their influence puts us in position to locate the key good-making property of scientific classifications not in their objectivity, but in their rationality. Such rationality, after all, centrally incorporates the human goals, abilities, and values that pragmatic classificatory norms often encode.

Edited Collections

Edited by Matthew H. Slater and Zanja YudellOxford University Press, 2017

The question of the proper role of metaphysics in philosophy of science is both significant and contentious. The last few decades have seen considerable engagement with philosophical projects aptly described as "the metaphysics of science:" inquiries into natural laws and properties, natural kinds, causal relations, and dispositions. At the same time, many metaphysicians have begun moving in the direction of more scientifically-informed ("scientistic" or "naturalistic") metaphysics. And yet many philosophers of science retain a deep suspicion about the significance of metaphysical investigations into science. This volume of new essays explores a broadly methodological question: what role should metaphysics play in our philosophizing about science? These new essays, written by leading philosophers of science, address this question both through ground-level investigations of particular issues in the metaphysics of science and by more general methodological inquiry.

Edited by William P. Kabasenche, Michael O'Rourke, and Matthew H. SlaterMIT Press, 2012 (Topics in Contemporary Philosophy vol. 10)

Fifteen original essays address the core semantic concepts of reference and referring from both philosophical and linguistic perspectives. After an introductory essay that casts current trends in reference and referring in terms of an ongoing dialogue between Fregean and Russellian approaches, the book addresses specific topics, balancing breadth of coverage with thematic unity. The contributors, all leading or emerging scholars, address trenchant neo-Fregean challenges to the direct reference position; consider what positive claims can be made about the mechanism of reference; address the role of a theory of reference within broader theoretical context; and investigate other kinds of linguistic expressions used in referring activities that may themselves be referring expressions.

The Environment: Philosophy, Science, & Ethics 

Edited by William P. Kabasenche, Michael O'Rourke, and Matthew H. SlaterMIT Press, 2012 (Topics in Contemporary Philosophy vol. 9)

The question of the proper role of metaphysics in philosophy of science is both significant and contentious. The last few decades have seen considerable engagement with philosophical projects aptly described as "the metaphysics of science:" inquiries into natural laws and properties, natural kinds, causal relations, and dispositions. At the same time, many metaphysicians have begun moving in the direction of more scientifically-informed ("scientistic" or "naturalistic") metaphysics. And yet many philosophers of science retain a deep suspicion about the significance of metaphysical investigations into science. This volume of new essays explores a broadly methodological question: what role should metaphysics play in our philosophizing about science? These new essays, written by leading philosophers of science, address this question both through ground-level investigations of particular issues in the metaphysics of science and by more general methodological inquiry.

Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science

Edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and Matthew H. SlaterMIT Press, 2011 (Topics in Contemporary Philosophy vol. 8)

Contemporary discussions of the success of science often invoke an ancient metaphor from Plato's Phaedrus: successful theories should "carve nature at its joints." But is nature really "jointed"? Are there natural kinds of things around which our theories cut? The essays in this volume offer reflections by a distinguished group of philosophers on a series of intertwined issues in the metaphysics and epistemology of classification.